The Correspondence Principle is the relation, which exists in certain economic models, between comparative statics of equilibria and the properties of out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
, larger prices result from a decrease in excess demand; hence excess demand is positive at larger prices. Similarly, excess demand is negative at smaller prices. As a result, tâtonnement dynamics will not approach p 2 1 after a small perturbation from p 2 1 . If the economy is subject to sporadic shocks, one should not observe p 2 1 , the unstable equilibrium. Hence, as a consequence of the correspondence between comparative statics and dynamics, one should expect an increase in excess demand to produce an increase in equilibrium price.
I shall give a general statement of the Correspondence Principle for the one-dimensional case. Consider a model where the endogenous variable takes values in [0, 1] and equilibria are determined as the fixed points of f (·, t) : [0, 1] → [0, 1]; t ∈ T ⊆ R is an exogenous parameter. Assume that T is convex and that f is C 1 . A selection of equilibria is a function e : T → [0, 1] such that e(t) = f (e(t), t) for all t ∈ T . Say that a fixed point x ∈ [0, 1] is stable if there is a neighborhood V of x such that any sequence {x n } satisfying x 0 ∈ V and x n+1 = f (x n ) for n ≥ 1, converges to x. Say that x ∈ [0, 1] is unstable if, for any neighborhood V of x, there is a neighborhood W of x such that all sequences defined as above eventually lie in the complement of W . Proposition 1. Let f be monotone increasing in t. If e is a continuous selection of equilibria that is strictly decreasing over some interval t, t , then for all t ∈ (t, t), e(t) is unstable.
Multidimensional models.
The one-dimensional CP is a relation between the sign of the comparativestatics change in prices, and the sign of excess demand for smaller and larger prices. When more than one price is determined, this relation does not need to exist. Still, the CP holds for monotone models; models where the different dimensions of the endogenous variables are in some sense complements. Monotone economic models stem mainly from game theoretic models with strategic complementarities.
I proceed to give a statement of the CP. Consider a model where the endogenous variable takes values in a compact rectangle X ⊆ R n , and equilibria are determined as the fixed points of f (·, t) : X → X; t ∈ T ⊆ R is a parameter and T is convex.
Proposition 2. Let f be monotone increasing in (x, t) and let e be a continuous selection of equilibria.
• If e is strictly decreasing over t, t ⊆ T , then for all t ∈ (t, t), e(t) is unstable.
• If e is strictly increasing over t, t , then for all t ∈ (t, t), if e(t)
is locally isolated, it is stable.
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